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THE GRAND EXPERIMENT: EVALUATING INDIAN LAW
IN THE "NEW WORLD"
Kevin J. Worthen*
When young Charles I ascended to the Spanish throne in 1516, there
was perhaps no more vexing problem facing him than the so-called "Indian question." In the slightly more than twenty years since Columbus
had first returned to Spain from the "New World," numerous stronglyheld, and directly-contradictory, opinions concerning the policy the
Spanish should pursue in interacting with the original inhabitants of the
Americas had been expressed and expounded by the royal advisors.
The early Spanish debate largely centered on the nature of the indigenous peoples the Spanish had "discovered." Opinions on this central
issue varied widely.' According to Gonzalo Herndndez de Oviedo, the
indigenous people were by nature "lazy and vicious, melancholic, cowardly, and in general a lying shiftless people." 2 Bartolom6 de Las Casas
took the opposite position, contending that "God created these simple
people without evil and without guile. They are most obedient and faithful to their natural lords and to the Christians whom they serve. They are
most submissive, patient, peaceful and virtuous. Nor are they quarrelsome, rancorous, querulous, or vengeful."3
Faced with such widely differing opinions and having little practical
experience of his own, the new King, acting through his Regent, Cardinal
Cisneros, authorized a series of experiments, whose central object was to
determine, in the words of historian Lewis Hanke, "whether the Indians

"Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. A version of
this article was presented to the Constitutional Law Section of the Inter-American Bar Association Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in May 1997. The author expresses appreciation
to Mark EchoHawk for his valuable research assistance in preparing this article.
1. Historian Lewis Hanke has observed that "[tihough more subtle theories were eventually developed, the majority of the Spaniards in the Indies in the first half century of the
conquest tended to look upon the natives either as 'noble savages' or as 'dirty dogs."' LEWIS
HANKE, THE FIRST SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS IN AMERICA: A STUDY INTHE DEVELOPMENT
OF SPANISH INDIAN POLICY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 19-20 (1964).

2. See id. at 20.
3. See id. at 20 (quoting BARTOLOMA DE LAS CASAS, BREVISSIMA RELACI6N (1924)).
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had the ability to live alone as free subjects of the King.",4 Hanke's phra-

seology was well-chosen. While the Indians were to be left more alone
than they had been since the arrival of Columbus, they were not to be
given complete independence to form their own society. They were to
live as the King's subjects. The royal instructions provided that the Indi-

ans were to be settled in towns of 300 families under one cacique or native chief, but the town was to be supervised by the resident priest and by
a responsible Spanish administrator.5 However, the towns, and the Indian

caciques, were given some autonomy to rule themselves. The instructions
provided:
[E]ach town is to have jurisdiction within its boundaries, and the said caciques
are to have jurisdiction to punish the Indians who transgress in the town where
they are superior, not only as regards their own people, but also as regards
those of the inferior caciques who live in the towns. This is to comprehend
those who deserve punishment up to whipping and no more. And upon these
they are not to execute punishment on their own order alone, but at least with
the supervisory advice and consent of the friar or priest who is there. The rest is
to be in the hands of the ordinary justice. If the caciques6 should do what they
ought not, they are to be punished by our ordinary justice.

4. See id. at 24. The actual experiments were not undertaken until after the regent, Cardinal Cisneros, dispatched three Jeronymite friars to the Indies to gather information on the
matter. See id. at 26-27. The friars were armed with a list of seven series of questions they
were to ask of the colonists, the third of which provided:

Does the witness know, believe, or has he heard it said, or observed, that
these Indians, especially those of Espafiola and women as well as men, are
all of such knowledge and capacity that they should be given complete liberty? Would they be able to live polfticamente as do the Spaniards? Would
they know how to support themselves by their own efforts, each Indian
mining gold or tilling the soil, or maintaining himself by other daily labor?
Do they know how to care for what they may acquire by this labor, spending
only for necessities, as a Castilian laborer would?
Id. at 29. Tellingly, not one of the colonists considered the Indians capable of living in freedom. See id. Perhaps equally tellingly, the questions were framed in a way that assumed that
Spanish conduct constituted the appropriate measure for determining the capacity of a person
to live without paternal supervision. One cannot wonder which of the two groups of persons
is more implicated by Licenciate Crist6val Serrano's assertion that "inasmuch as Indians
showed no greediness or desire for wealth... they would inevitably lack the necessities of
life if not supervised by the Spaniards." Id. at 30.
5. See Woodrow Borah, Justice By Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial
Mexico And The Legal Aides Of The Half-Real 21-22 (1983). As Hanke noted, "[a]pparently
even free Indians were thought to need some supervision." HANKE, supra note 1, at 45.
6. BORAH, supra note 5, at 22 (quoting English Translation of the Instructions from
Madrid, Sept. 13, 1516, in SIMPSON, The Encomienda: Forced Native Labor 195 (1929)).
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Thus, a form of measured autonomy was contemplated for the indigenous peoples subject to the experiments. Their leaders were to have

control over their own affairs, subject to limits as to the amount of punishment, and to advisory, and sometimes compulsory, supervision by the
King's officers.
The first of these royally-commanded experiments7 began in 1519 in
Espafiola under the direction of Rodrigo de Figueroa.' Figueroa organized

three villages of natives, freed from encomiendas belonging to the
Crown, absentee econmenderos, and other Spanish officials, 9 and the experiments began. From the Spanish standpoint the experiments "soon

proved to be a fiasco."'" Figueroa reported that even though he had carefully chosen the village administrators and visited the villages often in
order "to detect any signs of capacity," he had found none." Similar experiments in Puerto Rico, 2 Venezuela,

3

and Cuba,' 4 were also declared

7. There had been a few locally initiated efforts to set at liberty a few individual natives
of Santo Domingo before this time. See HANKE, supra note 1, at 36; Robert Jones Shafer, A
History OF Latin America at 60. The failure of these efforts was an oft-repeated basis for the
pessimistic conclusions of the colonists consulted by the Jeronymite friars. See HANKE,
supra note 1,at 36-37.
8. Antonio de la Gama was ordered to carry out a similar program in Puerto Rico at
approximately the same time. See HANKE, supra note 1,at 42, 45.
9. See C. H. Haring, The Spanish Empire In America 46 (1963). See also HANKE, supra
note I, at 43.
10. Haring, supra note 9, at 46.
11. HANKE, supra note 1, at 47. Figueroa's failure may have been due in part to the fact
that he was apparently more interested in amassing wealth for himself than in helping the
experiment succeed. See HANKE, supra note 1, at 45. The failure was undoubtedly contributed to by resistance from the colonists who feared that their source of inexpensive labor
would evaporate if the experiment succeeded. See HANKE, supra note 1, at 45. In response,
both Bartolom6 de Las Casas (who was in Spain urging the King to move forward with the
experiments) and the Jeronymite friars suggested the importation of slaves from Africa to
save the natives from destruction. See Haring, supra note 9, at 50 n.10.
12. Those in charge of the experiment in Puerto Rico, which commenced the same time
as the experiment in Espafiola, "informed the [King] that the experiment there was a failure,
that the Indians benefited not at all because they lacked the requisite ability, and that they
had much better be put to work building a fortress to ward off the attacks of the warlike
Carib Indians." See HANKE, supra note 1, at 48.
13. In 1520 Bartolom6 de Las Casas obtained permission to start his own self-supporting
Indian community near the town of Cumand. See Haring, supra note 9, at 46; Shafer, supra
note 7, at 61. However, many of the friars assigned to the mission failed to reach the Indies
because of storms, most of the farmers Las Casas recruited to join him abandoned the project
in Puerto Rico in favor of Ponce de Le6n's Florida expedition. See Shafer, supra note 7, at
61. The natives, unable to distinguish between Spanish slavers and Las Casas' followers,
killed or scattered those who eventually reached the site. See Haring, supra note 9, at 46.
14. At least two efforts were made to initiate free Indian villages in Cuba between 1525-
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failures, and having determined that the Indians could not live alone as
free subjects of the King, the Spanish eventually developed what one
Mexican legal scholar has described as "an official policy of benevolent
guardianship" toward the indigenous people. 5

The first "Indian experiments" were over. From the Spanish standpoint they seemed to show that the indigenous people of the Americas
were not capable of governing themselves as free subjects of European

Kings. Although debate concerning the nature of the indigenous people

continued,16 the general outlines of official Spanish policy toward the
indigenous people of America were determined in light of these and other
"failed" experiments. Because early British, French, and Portuguese pol-

icy all relied to some extent on the early Spanish experience,

7

they too

were somewhat influenced by the initial Spanish conclusion that indigenous people could not live alone as free subjects of the European sovereign.
However, it is now increasingly clear that the initial "Indian" experiments did not end in 1535. From one perspective, the past 400 years
has really been a continuation of the early Spanish Indian experiments.
The experiments have continued in the various countries of the Americas,
and indeed, throughout the world. Radically different policies with respect to indigenous people have been adopted in different countries, and

even within the same country, over the past 400 years.' 8 Each of these

1535. See HANKE, supra note 1, at 49-71. At the conclusion of the second of these, the Governor reported that he believed "the Indians in no way capable of living by themselves, and
recommended that they be given to some Spaniard in Bayamo." HANKE, supra note 1, at 67.
15. See Guillermo Floris Margadant, Official Mexican Attitudes toward the Indians: An
HistoricalEssay, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 964, 968 (1980).
16. Among the most notable debates was the 1550 debate between Bartolom6 de Las
Casas and Juan Gin6s de Sepulveda. See Wilcomb E. Washburn, Red Man's Land/White
Man's Law: The Past and Present Status of the American Indian 14-17 (2d ed. 1995).
17. As the noted historian Lymin Tyler explained,
The first European nation to attempt to deal with the problems involved in
legalizing the relationships between European-Americans and Indians was
Spain, and Spanish law became the basis for French, English, Portuguese,
and United States law pertaining to the Indians, as well as that of the republics of Latin America after they gained their independence from Spain and
Portugal.
S. Lyman Tyler, The Indian Cause in Spanish Laws of the Indies xxxviii (1980).
18. For example, "one of the most striking characteristics of formal federal policy toward
Native Americans [in the United States] since the Revolutionary War has been its inconsistency. Massive swings between separationist and assimilationist attitudes, goals, and means
have been the norm." Kevin J. Worthen, One Small Step for Courts, One Giant Leap for
Group Rights: Accommodating the Associational Role of "Intimate" Government Associaions, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 595, 629 (1993).

1998]

]'E GRAND EXPFNRVF

303

policies was based to some extent on the particular policymakers' answers to the question whether, and to what extent, indigenous people can,

and should be permitted, to live alone as free subjects of the nation in
which they reside. After more than 500 years of experimentation, it seems
appropriate to start evaluating the data that has accumulated.
This article attempts to begin that process, not with the intent of determining what the data shows us about the nature and capacities of in-

digenous people, the focus of the original Spanish experiments, but with
the goal of learning about the legal systems that have developed in the
"New World" and their relationship to, and impact on, indigenous people.
The article represents only a first step in this process. It focuses on the
policies of eight countries19 with respect to a single, but extremely important, legal issue for indigenous people, their right of sovereignty or
self-determination. Four of the countries: the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, are common-law countries whose policies
were shaped to some extent by their English predecessors. The other four
countries: Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Nicaragua, are civil law countries,
whose policies are more closely tied to that of their Iberian predecessors,
Spain and Portugal.
A broader cross-sample of legal issues20 and countries will have to be
considered before any final conclusions can be reached. Yet, this paper
focuses on what may be the central issue for indigenous peoples; the right
of self-determination or sovereignty." The eight country sample is suffi19. The author does not profess to be an expert on the Indian laws of all eight countries.
While having considerable experience addressing issues involving U.S. Indian law and some
prior experience working with and studying Chilean law on the subject, the author's knowledge of the laws of other countries are limited to research performed for this paper. Moreover, while the author had some access to materials from all eight countries, information from
the Latin American countries, with the exception of Chile, was limited primarily to secondary materials. Finally, the reader should note that little effort has been made at this point to
determine how the law on the books has actually been implemented in the real world. In
short, what has been said about any comparative law endeavor that it is to some extent "necessarily superficial." See also Bernhard Grossfeld, The Strengths and Weaknesses of Comparative Law 41 (1990).
20. At a bare minimum, any full evaluation would have to consider a country's policy
with respect to ownership and use of indigenous lands, indigenous control over membership
in the indigenous group, and language rights.
21. The depth of indigenous sentiment with regard to the topic is illustrated by the following report on the sixth session of the Working Group of Indigenous Populations.
[A]ccording to the overwhelming majority of indigenous representatives,
self-determination and self-government should be amongst the fundamental
principles of the draft declaration [of indigenous rights] .... Many speakers
underlined that it was essential for the draft declaration to guarantee in the
strongest language possible free and genuine indigenous institutions.
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ciently broad to include civil and common law systems, and yet the scope
is sufficiently narrow in that all the countries were influenced by the early
Spanish experience in the new world. Each state developed at roughly the

same time period and under similar conditions. From these circumstances
we may draw a few general observations.
22

I. SOVEREIGNTY: THE RIGHT OF SELF DETERMINATION

From a practical standpoint, the indigenous people of the "New
World" exercised sovereignty over all the lands they occupied prior to the

arrival of the Europeans.23 The key question for the European govern-

ments and their Western successors has how much of that power would
be recognized. The ability to govern themselves - to determine their own
future has also long been a key component of indigenous people's concept of themselves. 24 Thus, it is not surprising that a great deal of the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Study of the
Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, Report of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations on Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/24 p. 80 (1988),
quoted in Raidza Torres, The Rights of IndigenousPopulations:The Emerging International
Norm, 16 Yale J. Int'l L. 127 (1991).
22. A variety of terms could be used to describe the right of indigenous people to establish and enforce their own standards of conduct within some political or territorial community. While some have argued against use of the term sovereignty in this context. See Garth
Nettheim, Peoples and Populations - Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples, in The
Rights of Peoples 118 (1988). The author has chosen to use the term "sovereignty" because
of its prominence in U.S. Indian law. Moreover, despite its controversial status, "possibly no
other word carries better with it the fundamental desire of peoples culturally in tune to exercise the maximum possible degree of control over their own destinies according to their own
cultural dictates." Peter Grose, The Indigenous Sovereignty Question and the Australian
Response, 3 Austl J. of Hum. Rts. 40,63 (1996).
23. As Patrick Mackem has noted when speaking of the indigenous people of Canada
and the United States, "[niot only were they 'here first,' but when they were here first, they
exercised sovereign authority. A claim of prior occupancy, in other words, often serves as a
proxy for a claim of prior sovereignty." Patrick Macklem, Distributing Sovereignty: Indian
Nations andEquality of Peoples, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1311, 1333-34 (1993).
24. In the words of one U.S. scholar,
[T]he [Native American] tribes wanted to be left to themselves .... Several treaties
provided that the tribes would be guaranteed 'absolute and undisturbed use and occupation' or that 'no persons except those herein so authorized to do ... shall ever
be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in, the territory described in this article.
Charles F. Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modem
Constitutional Democracy 16 (1987).
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contention, both physically and legally, between the various nation-states
and indigenous people has surrounded the issue of the extent to which
indigenous people would be allowed to retain the sovereignty they previ-

ously enjoyed.
One of the essential components of sovereignty is the ability to establish and enforce norms of conduct within the political or territorial
community.' That aspect of sovereignty is the focus of this article. While
it is impossible in this article to describe in any detail the various policies
adopted by the eight countries on that issue over time, it is clear that three
main kinds of responses have been adopted at a national level by these
countries: (1) formal recognition of an aboriginal right of sovereignty, (2)
delegation of governmental authority to indigenous groups, and (3) refusal to give any formal governmental power to the indigenous people.
Moreover, a variety of approaches have been adopted within each of
these three main categories.
A. Recognition of InherentSovereignty
Only one of the eight countries - the United States - has formally
recognized and made a part of its formal law, the inherent right of indigenous people to govern themselves. In one of its earliest Indian law cases,
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that each Indian tribe or nation was
"a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing
its own affairs and governing itself." 26 Subsequently, the Court made
clear that the tribes powers to govern "are, in general, 'inherent powers of
a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.' 27 This recognition was in some respects the logical extension of the British, and then
28
U.S., policy of dealing with indigenous people through formal treaties,
because it was assumed at the time that "both parties to treaties were sovereign powers."29
However, inherent tribal sovereignty in the United States is not with25. "All the characteristics of sovereignty," said [Jean] Bodin, "are contained in this, to
have power to give laws to each and everyone of his subjects, and to receive none from
them." Harold J. Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty and Other Essays 17 (1921).
26. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831). The issue involved in
Cherokee Nation was whether article III of the U.S. Constitution, which granted the Supreme
Court authority to exercise original jurisdiction over cases between a State of the Union and
a foreign State, authorized the Supreme Court to hear a suit filed by the Cherokee Nation
against the state of Georgia. The Court concluded that while the Cherokee Nation was a
"state," it was not a foreign State, but rather a "domestic dependant nation." Id. Accordingly,
the Court dismissed the case.
27. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (quoting Felix S. Cohen, Felix S.
Cohen'S Handbook of Federal Indian Law 122 (1941)).
28. See Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties 21 (1994).
29. Felix S. Cohen, Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 53 (1982).
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out its limits. As the Supreme Court made clear in Cherokee Nation,
Tribes are not independent foreign states, but rather "domestic dependant3

nations,"3 whose sovereignty is of a "unique and limited character," '
subject to limitations from three sources. First, "Congress, has plenary

authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local selfgovernment which the tribes otherwise possess. ' 32 Second, tribes can, and
have relinquished some of their sovereignty through treaties with the U.S.
government. 33 Finally, federal common law prohibits a tribe from exercising governmental authority which is "inconsistent with the dependant
' Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, "Indian
status of the tribes."34
tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or
statute, and or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent
30. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet) at 17.
31. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
32. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). See also Escondido Mutual
Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 787 n.30 (1984) ("[A]ll aspects of Indian sovereignty are subject to defeasance by Congress."). Congress has exercised
that authority in the most extreme form, complete elimination of tribal sovereignty, during
the Termination Era of the 1950's. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The
Evolution of the TerminationPolicy, 5 Am. Indian L. Rev. 139 (1977).
33. "Obvious examples are provided by the vast land cessions made by treaty which
ended tribal power over the ceded areas. Some treaties also contain clauses requiring tribes to
permit federal supervision within their territories." Cohen, supra note 30, at 242.
34. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,564 (1981). The two common-law limits that
courts originally placed on tribes were the inability to freely alienate tribal land and a prohibition against entering into direct diplomatic or commercial relations with foreign nations.
See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 17-18. More recently, the Supreme Court has held that tribes lack the authority to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and that it can exercise civil jurisdiction over
non-tribal members on non-tribal lands within the reservation only when those "nonmembers
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members" or engage in activity that
"threatens or has some direct effect on the political...." 191 (1978); Montana, 450 U.S. at
565-566, 559 (holding that a tribe has no authority to regulate hunting and integrity, the economic security, or health of the tribe." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. fishing
on fee lands owned by non-tribal members); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993)
(holding that a tribe cannot regulate hunting and fishing on federal land); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (holding that a
tribe cannot exercise zoning authority over lands owned by non-tribal member on portion of
the reservation opened up to public access); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997)
(holding that a tribe cannot exercise jurisdiction over civil law suit arising out of automobile
accident between two non-Indians on state road located on the reservation). The Supreme
Court has also ruled that tribes have no inherent authority to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over Indians who are not members of the tribe, but Congress subsequently overrode the decision. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990); Pub.L. No. 101-511, §8077 (b)-(d), 104 Stat.
1892 (1990); Pub.L. No. 102-137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991).
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status." 35
This inherent sovereignty includes the power to regulate the domestic relations of tribal members36 and to tax37 tribal members and nonmembers who enter on tribal lands in "Indian Country." 38 However, U.S.
courts have recently narrowed the reach of tribal authority over nonmembers, 39 so that the tribes' inherent sovereignty is more and more being limited to authority over tribal members themselves.' Still, the inher-

ent sovereignty of the tribe to regulate its own affairs, and even the affairs
of others to some extent, is significant.
While none of the other seven countries surveyed has formally rec-

ognized any aspect of their indigenous people's inherent sovereignty, 4
recent events in Canada and New Zealand have opened the way for such

recognition. In both countries the seeds for such recognition were planted

long ago when the governments entered into treaties with the indigenous
people, an act which, as noted above, seems to imply some recognition of
the sovereign status of the indigenous entity with whom the treaty is
made.
Following the British practice adopted by the United States, Can-

ada's government recognized some "native governments for the purpose
of signing treaties and surrendering land,"'42 but there was no subsequent

express recognition of this indigenous sovereignty in any judicial or leg35. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
36. Jurisdiction over the divorce of two tribal members who reside on the reservation is
vested exclusively in the tribe. See Whyte v. District Court, 346 P.2d. 1012 (Colo. 1959),
cert. denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960). Tribal authority over the adoption of tribal members residing on the reservation is, with minor exceptions, also exclusive, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1903
(1988); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). Tribes also retain limited authority
over adoptions involving tribal members who do not reside on the reservation. 25 U.S.C. §
1911 (1988).
37. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
38. Tribal criminal and civil jurisdiction exists only in "Indian country." See 18 U.S.C. §§
1151-52 (1988) (criminal jurisdiction); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425,
427 n.2 (1975) (civil jurisdiction). "Indian country" includes all lands within a reservation,
regardless of the form of ownership, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), as well as some limited areas outside the reservation, 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b)-(c) (stating that lands which are "dependent Indian
communities" or "Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished").
39. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
40. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, at 695 n.15 (stating that with the two
limited exceptions, "tribal sovereignty over nonmembers 'cannot survive without express
congressional delegation' (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 564)).
41. It is possible to argue that Australia has done so on a very limited basis. See infra note
145.
42. Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and United States
Policy Toward Indians,66 Wash. L. Rev. 643, 709 (1991).
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islative action in the 19th century. 43 Instead, the government enacted the
Indian Act,' which sought to impose on the natives a form of municipal
government under which Tribal Band Councils elected according to Canadian standards,4' were delegated authority over a few minor matters. 6
This express delegation of authority, which is discussed in more detail

below,47 seemed to curtail any other serious governmental discussion of
inherent sovereignty.
However, neither Parliament nor the Canadian Supreme Court defi-

nitely closed the door on the possibility that First Nations might still possess some form of inherent sovereignty, and several scholars have suggested that the door is now open. 4 The vehicle for such recognition may
be section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act, which provides that "existing
43. As one scholar has noted, "the Crown officers utilized the traditional government
only for land surrenders and treaties, and otherwise deprived that traditional government of
any powers of management or control." Richard H. Bartlett, The Indian Act of Canada,27
Buff. L. Rev. 581, 593 (1978).
44. The Indian Act was first passed in 1876 as a consolidation of Indian legislation then
in force. See Indian Act, ch. 18 (1876) (Can.); Bartlett, supra note 44, at 584-85. The concept
of the Tribal Band Council was first enacted in 1869. Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians
and the Better Management of Indian Affairs Act, c. VI, § 10 (1869); see also Bartlett, supra
note 44, at 569; Johnson, supra note 43, at 709.
45. The original provision, section ten of the 1869 Act for the Gradual Enfranchisement
of Indians and the Better Management of Indian Affairs provided:
The Governor may order that the Chiefs of any tribe, band, or body of Indians shall
be elected by the male members of each Indian settlement of the full age of twentyone years at such time and place, and in such manner, as the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs may direct, and they shall in such case be elected for a period
of three years, unless deposed by the Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, or
immorality, and they shall be in the proportion of one Chief and two Second Chiefs
for every two hundred people ....
Gradual Enfranchisement of Indians and the Better Management of Indian Affairs Act c. VI,
§ 10. The provision has been only slightly altered since that time. See Bartlett, supra note 44,
at 594; Johnson, supranote 43, at 709.
46. According to one scholar, "[tihe Indian-elected governments were given only trivial
powers, and generally were subjected to stifling supervision by government." Johnson, supra
note 43, at 709.
47. See infratext related to notes 86-88.
48. "Many experts assert that First Nations still have sovereign governmental powers,
even though seldom used and yet unrecognized by the federal government. Some suggest
that it is not the sovereign governmental powers of Indigenous peoples that are ill-defined,
but the recognition of these powers in Canadian law." Johnson, supra note 43, at 710 (citing
Canada House of Commons, Special Committee on Indian Self-Government, Indian SelfGovernment in Canada 42-43 (1983)).
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aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirned." 49 Whether section 35 creates the neces-

sary legal mechanism for recognizing and revitalizing inherent aboriginal
sovereignty, as some advocate,50 remains to be seen." In the meantime,
several bands of First Nations are in the process of negotiating selfgovernment agreements with the federal government, 2 an action which

could lead to formal recognition of some form of inherent sovereignty in
at least some areas of Canada. 3
A similar, though less-advanced, trend toward formal recognition of
some form of inherent sovereignty for indigenous peoples can be seen in
New Zealand. Again, the seeds of the current trend were sown more than
a century ago when Great Britain entered into a treaty with the Maori -

the indigenous people of New Zealand. The mere fact that the British
entered into the Treaty of Waitangi with a number of Maori chiefs in
1840, would seem to provide some basis for an argument that the British
49. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II, § 35(1).
50. See, e.g., Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, AboriginalRights and CanadianSovereignty: An Essay on R. v. Sparrow, 29 Alta. L. Rev. 492 (1991); Patrick Macklem, First
NationsSelf Government and the Borders of the CanadianLegal Imagination, 36 McGill L.
J. 382 (1991); John Burrows, A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and FirstNations
Self-Government, 30 Osgoode Hall L. J. 1 (1992); Bob Freedman, The Space for Aboriginal
Rights of Self-Government in British Columbia: The Effect of the Decision of the British
Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 28 U.B.C. L. Rev. 49
(1994).
51. In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that
while First Nations may possess some powers of self-government, aboriginal powers of sovereignty were extinguished at the time that British Columbia joined the Canadian Confederation in 1871. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1993] 5 W.W.R. 97. Any powers of
self-government that remain, according to the court, are in the nature of internal rights of
self-regulation. See Bob Freedman, Models for Aboriginal Rights of Self- Government in
British Columbia: Inherent Rights, ContingentRights or Illusory Rights, in IX Sovereignty
Symposium 365,366 (1996).
In 1995, however, the federal government's Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development issued a policy paper stating its position that the inherent right of selfgovernment is an "existing right" within the meaning of section 35. Id. at 373 (citing Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal
Self-Government- The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the Inherent
Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government (1995)).
52. See Freedman, supranote 52, at 367-77; David H. Getches et al., Federal Indian Law:
Cases and Materials 997 (3d ed. 1993).
53. In a nationwide referendum held in the fall of 1992, Canadian voters defeated the
Charlottetown Accord which would have amended the Canadian Constitution. Among the
provisions that would have been adopted had the Accord been ratified was an amendment to
section 35 that would have recognized that "the Aboriginal peoples of Canada have the inherent right of self-government within Canada." Freedman, supra note 52, at 377-78.
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recognized the sovereign status of the Maori people. However, that posi-

tion was not adopted by New Zealand for two primary reasons.
First, in 1872, the New Zealand Supreme Court in Wi Paratav.
Bishop of Wellington5 4 rejected a contention that a grant from the Crown
to a third party violated the Treaty of Waitangi by ruling that "the Maori
Tribes were incapable of performing the duties, and therefore of assum56
''
ing the rights, of a civilized community." Similar subsequent rulings
caused one writer in 1971 to declare that "the Treaty of Waitangi is

worthless and of no effect. It is a non-treaty."57 Of equal, if not more importance, the English version of the Treaty text provides that the Maori

"cede to her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the right and powers of Sovereignty which [they] respectively

exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or possess over their
respective Territories as the sole Sovereigns thereof.""8
Given this treaty language and rulings like Wi Parata,it is understandable why the concept of inherent Maori sovereignty did not advance
very far in New Zealand until recently. However, the 1975 Treaty of

Waitangi Act, which resulted from increasingly vigorous Maori protest

about their treatment under New Zealand law 9 , addressed both barriers in
ways that have left the door somewhat open for future recognition of

some aspects of inherent sovereignty for the Maori.
First, without rendering the Treaty a legally enforceable limit on

54. See Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington [1877] 3 N.Z.L.R. 72 (N.Z.).
55. Id. at 77.
56. In Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker, the New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the efforts of
a Maori to challenge the grant of lands by the Crown to a third party. See Nireaha Tamaki v.
Baker [18941 12 N.Z.L.R. 483. While that specific decision was reversed by the Board, its
decision was immediately nullified by an Act of Parliament. See David C. Williams, The
ConstitutionalStatus of the Treaty of Waitangi: An HistoricalPerspective, 14 N.Z.U. L. Rev.
9, 14 (1990).
57. Mulloy, The Non-Treaty of Waitangi,N.Z. L.J. 193, 196 (1971), quoted in Williams,
supra note 57, at 15. This observation reflected the Court's view in Wi Paratathat the treaty
was a "simple nullity." Wi Parata[1877] 3 N.Z.L.R. at 78.
58. Treaty of Waitangi Act, sched. 1, art. I (1975) (N.Z.).
59. As two members of the original Waitangi Tribunal observed:
Maori protest, about land and fishing losses, the destruction of their tribal ways and
the failure to provide for their culture, was continued with barely a pause and before every forum until, in the heady days of the 1960s, it was taken to the streets.
The Waitangi Tribunal was established in response, in 1975.
E. Taihakurei Durie & Gordon S. Orr, The Role of the Waitangi Tribunaland the Development ofa BiculturalJurisprudence,14 N.Z.U. L.Rev. 62 (1990).
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state authority, 60 the 1975 Act created a special tribunal authorized to investigate and report on legislative or executive actions that violate the
principles of the Treaty.6 ' While the Tribunal has no enforcement powers,
its recommendations have affected both legislative6 2 and judicial deci-

sions. 63 Moreover, as a result of the increasing attention given to the

60. Without express legislation making the Treaty binding on the government, the Treaty
is not legally enforceable in New Zealand courts because of the well-established principle of
New Zealand law that "legislation is required to make a treaty part of domestic law." W. K.
Hastings, New Zealand Treaty PracticeWith ParticularReference to the Treaty of Waitangi,
38 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 668 (1989); see also Kenneth Keith, The Treaty of Waitangi in the
Courts, 14 N.Z.U. L. Rev. 37-46 (1990). This principle is in large part due to the lack of any
need to obtain legislative approval of a treaty in the first instance. As one scholar explains:
"This principle is a necessary counterweight to the executive's treaty-making power, for
without it the executive would be able to circumvent the legislature and change the law of the
land by adoption." Hastings, supra, at 668.
61. Under the Act, Maori persons "prejudicially affected" have the right to petition the
Tribunal concerning any past or proposed governmental policies, legislation or practices
which they believe to be inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty. The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, No. 114, § 6(1), 33 R.S. 907, 911-912 (1995). The Tribunal then investigates
that claim and if it determines that the claim is "well-founded," it "recommend[s] to the
Crown that action be taken to compensate for or remove the prejudice or to prevent other
persons from being similarly affected in the future." Id. § 6(3), 33 R.S. at 912.
62. For example:
[A]t the Tribunal's request, New Zealand's State-Owned Enterprise Act of 1986,
which authorizes transfer of Crown land to state-created enterprises, was amended
to include a stipulation that "nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a
manner that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.
Getches et. al., supranote 53, at 1006.
63. In Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley Authority, the court held that the
Planning Tribunal should consider the spiritual and cultural relationship of the Maori people
to the waters of the region when deciding whether to approve a permit for the discharge of
treated dairy water and waste into the waters. See Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato
Valley Authority [1988] 2 N.S.L.R. 188. After reviewing the Tribunal's recommendation in
a similar case, the court noted:
While, so far as the present case is concerned, no report of that Tribunal is in any
way binding on this Court, its considered opinions, within the area of its expert
functions, ought to be accorded due weight in this Court. The way in which the
Waitangi Tribunal has dealt with the concept of Maori spiritual values in regard to
water establishes, sufficiently for the determination of this branch of the appellant's
case, that those values cannot be dismissed in a general sort of way....
Id. at 223.

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 5:299

Treaty, Parliament has, on its own, adopted provisions requiring state
actors to adhere to the principles of the Treaty in some situations.64 Thus,
the viability of the Treaty has been restored. 65
The 1975 Act also provides an opening for overcoming the seem-

ingly clear cession of Maori sovereignty in the Treaty by noting that "the
text of the Treaty in the English language differs from the text of the

Treaty in the Maori language." 66 In the Maori text, the term "kawanatanga" is used for sovereignty - a missionary Maori word for "government." 7 As noted by the New Zealand Court of Appeals in 1987, an
English version of the text developed by translating from Maori into
English could provide that the chiefs "give absolutely to the Queen of
England forever the complete government of their land. 6 ' From this version, it is possible to argue that the Maori chiefs simply recognized the

right of the Queen to legislate, without completely diminishing their right
to set and enforce rules for their own tribal members.' The 1975 Act
64. For example, The Conservation Act of 1987 requires that the Act "be interpreted and
administered as to give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." Kenneth Keith,
supra, note 61 at 56. Similarly, the title to the Environment Act of 1986, provides that it is
enacted, in part, to "ensure that, in the management of natural and physical resources, full
and balanced account is taken of... The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." Id.
65. Indeed, the Huakina Development Trust court referred to the Treaty as part of the
"fabric of New Zealand society." Getches et al., supra note 53, at 1007. However, it should
be kept in mind that even if valid, the Treaty is not directly enforceable in New Zealand
courts in the absence of implementing legislation. See supranote 61.
66. The Treaty of Waitangi Act, (1975) (N.Z.).
67. Getches et. al., supra note 53, at 1002.
68. Robert MacDonald, The Maori of Aotearora-New Zealand 8, 11(Minority Rights
Group Report 1990).
69. This view of the Treaty is confirmed by the Maori version of the Second Article of
the Treaty. The official English version states:
Her Majesty the Queen... confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes
...and to their respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive
and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates, Forests, Fisheries and
other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long
as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession.
Treaty of Waitangi Act sch. 1. For the rerm "undisturbed possession," the Maori text uses the
term "te tino rangatiratanga"- translated as "chieftainship." Treaty of Waitangi sch. 2. The
English translation of the Maori text provides that the Queen agrees "to protect the chiefs ...
in the unqualified exercise of their chieftainship over their lands, villages and all their treasures." MacDonald, supra note 69, at 11. The use of the Maori term "te tino rangatiratanga"
in the second article was especially likely to lead to confusion given the contemporary usage
of the term among the Maori. As Claudia Orange explains:
[T]he Maori understood the word to mean far more than "possession," as in
the English text. In fact, it was a better approximation to sovereignty than
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provides that, for purposes of the Act, the Tribunal has "exclusive
authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied
in the two texts and to decide issues raised by the differences between

them."70 The Tribunal has indicated that the Maori text will ordinarily

prevail in cases of conflict between the two versions. 7 Thus, there is
some opening for the position that the Treaty did not extinguish all rights

of inherent Maori sovereignty, and the Chairman of the Waitangi Tribunal has advocated creation of a right of "tribal self-government" for the
Maori.72 While significant obstacles remain, not the least of which is New3
Zealand's adoption of the Austinian theory of indivisible sovereignty,?

kawanatanga [the term used for sovereignty in the First Article]. Although
both words implied an exercise of power, authority and jurisdiction, rangatiratanga was of Maori derivation, with connotations of chiefly power that
were familiar to Maori. Kawanatanga, on the other hand, derived from kawana (governor) and had associations with Pontius Pilate, Roman governor
in the Bible, or with governors of New South Wales. It tended to imply
authority in an abstract rather than a concrete sense.
Contemporary use of the words in scripture and liturgy reinforced this implication. In the decade before 1840, the dispersion of thousands of biblical
texts, translated by ... missionaries ... had familiarized many Maori with
the nuances of the meaning which they debated exhaustively. Rangatiratanga expressed God's "kingdom" in translations of the Lord's Prayer,
daily evening prayers, in the burial prayers and in the gospels, whereas kawanatangamost often referred to rulership or principality in a vaguer sense.
...Rangatiratanga,moreover, had been used in the 1835 Declaration of Independence to refer to New Zealand's "independence" which Britain had acknowledged. The Maori might well have assumed, therefore, that their sovereign rights were actually being confirmed in return for a limited concession of power in kawanatanga.
Id.
70. Treaty of Waitangi Act § 5(2), 33 R.S. at 911 (1995).
71. See R.P. Boast, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General: The Case of the
Century?, N.Z. L.J. 240, 243 (1987). Boast states that although the Tribunal refers to the
general rule of international law that no text of a treaty in two or more languages has superiority, it then refers to the U.S. rule that treaties should be understood "in the sense in which
they would naturally be understood by the Indians." Id. at 245, 248 n.6 (quoting Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899)).
72. E. Taihakurei Durie, Protection ofMinorities, N.Z. L.J.260 (Aug. 1987).
73. As one scholar has noted, Austin's condemnation of "'half of imperfectly sovereign
states' . . . laid the basis of English legal theory's mid-nineteenth century pre-occupation
with the indivisibility of sovereignty. This pre-occupation gravely hamstrung British colonial
policy in the Pacific." P. G. McHugh, Maori FishingRights and the North American Indian,
6 Otago L. Rev. 62, 89 (1985) (quoting John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law 252-56 (5th ed. 1911)). See also Robert N. Clinton et al., American
Indian Law: Cases and Materials 1229-30 (3d ed. 1991) ("Most commonwealth courts have
refused to accept the theory of inherent sovereignty of aboriginal peoples ...[in part as a
result of the influence] of Austin's theory of indivisible sovereignty on English jurisprudence
in the early twentieth century.").
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the clear trend is toward some sort of recognition of sovereign rights.74
In summary, while the United States is the only country which has so

far clearly recognized inherent sovereignty, Canada seems on the verge of
doing so, and New Zealand has taken the initial steps in that direction.

B. Authority DelegatedFrom the National Government
Without necessarily recognizing the inherent right of indigenous

people to govern themselves, several countries in the survey have expressly authorized indigenous groups within their borders to exercise
some governmental authority.75 This "delegation" of governing authority
74. This trend is further evidenced by delegation of some governmental authority to
Maori iwi. See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
75. Because the kind of inherent sovereignty recognized by the United States is subject to
modification, and even complete elimination, by the national legislature, and because that
national legislature is also the body that generally determines the extent of delegated powers
in the United States and other countries, the distinction between inherent sovereignty and
delegated authority may seem overly formalistic. While the limits of indigenous sovereignty
is ultimately determined by the national political process under either approach, there are
reasons why the inherent sovereignty approach may be more beneficial to indigenous peoples.
First, the notion of inherent sovereignty is not necessarily linked, as it is in the United
States, to Congress' plenary power to override it.
In countries such as Canada, where aboriginal rights are constitutionally protected, recognizing autonomy as an inherent right would
insulate it from arbitrary legislative modification or elimination.
See Freedman, supra note 52, at 370-71.
Second, even when inherent sovereignty is subject to complete legislative defeasance,
as in the United States, the basis for the exercise of power may be important because, under
U.S. law, exercises of inherent tribal sovereignty are "unconstrained by those constitutional
provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority." Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). Thus, courts have held that neither the Fifth,
Fourteenth nor First amendments to the U.S. Constitution apply to a Tribe's exercise of inherent sovereignty. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 385 (1896) (Fifth amendment provision
requiring indictment by grand jury); Mission Indians v. American Management & Amusement, Inc. 840 F.2d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1987) (takings clause of Fifth Amendment); Native
American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th Cir. 1959) (freedom of
religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d
553, 557 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (Fourteenth Amendment). Tribal
exercises of delegated federal-authority presumably would be. Thus, exercises of inherent
authority are likely to be more unrestrained than those of delegated authority, even if they are
not themselves constitutionally protected from the political process.
Finally, at a more practical level, it is likely to be easier to prevent Congress from
harming one's interests (the action Tribes with inherent authority would seek to avoid) than it
is to get Congress to act in one's favor at the expense of others (the action Tribes wanting
delegated authority would have to seek). See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy 55 (2d ed. 1995) (suggesting that
elected representatives will try to avoid voting against the interest of any group because "a
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has taken a variety of forms, including (1) delegation of governmental
authority to an already existing indigenous entity, (2) delegation of

authority to a state-created unit of government for indigenous people, (3)
creation of an autonomous subunit of government in an area in which
indigenous people constitute a majority of the voters who control the
subunit, and (4) delegation of ability to determine the laws and customs

to be applied by national courts in actions involving indigenous people.
Each of these actions formally grants the indigenous people some authority to establish or enforce norms of conduct for themselves and, in some
instances, others.
1. Delegation to an Exiting Indigenous Entity
A governmental delegation of power to an already existing indige-

nous entity may carry with it an implicit recognition that the indigenous
entity has at least some pre-existing sovereignty.76 Thus, it is not surprising that the only clear delegation of authority to an existing indigenous
entity is found in the United States, where the inherent sovereignty of
Indian tribal governments has been expressly recognized. The U.S. Indian
tribes have been given federal authority to regulate and prohibit the sale
of alcohol in Indian country.77 In addition, U.S. Indian tribes are authorized to exercise governmental authority, including the power to set water
effluent78 and air quality standards,79 under a number of federal environmental statutes.80 In many of these statutes, Tribes are treated similarly, if
vote in favor of an interest group's preferences is weighted less than a vote against those
same preferences"). Thus, inherent rights are likely to be more extensive than delegated
rights even when the former are not constitutionally protected or limited.
76. InUnited States v. Mazurie, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld congressional delegation
to tribal governments of authority to regulate liquor sales by non-Indians. See United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975). The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' conclusion that
the delegation was an unconstitutional delegation of lawmaking authority to a nongovernment entity, noting that "Indian tribes ... are a good deal more than 'private voluntary
organizations"' and that they are "unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty
over both their members and their territory." Id. at 557.
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1154(1988) prohibits the introduction of alcoholic beverages into Indian
country. However, under 18 U.S.C. § 1161, the proscription does not apply to any act in
conformity with the laws of the state, "and with an ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over such area of Indian country." 18 U.S.C. §1161 (1988).
78. Under the Clean Water Act, the EPA is authorized to delegate implementation of the
discharge permit system to an Indian tribe. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)-(b), 1377(e) (1988).
79. Under the Clean Air Act, tribes can redesignate or change air quality standards on an
Indian reservation. The tribe can also object to a new emission source outside the reservation
that contributes to air pollution on the reservation greater than that permitted by the tribe. 42
U.S.C. § 7474 (1988).
80. Tribes are given implementation and standard setting authority under the Safe Drink-
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not identically, to states.8 '

These delegations of authority arguably extend the scope of tribal
autonomy beyond the limits of the inherent right of sovereignty.8 2 They
also confirm the principle that tribal entities are capable of governing
themselves and others in their territories.
A similar kind of delegation is found in the Indian Act of Canada,
which grants to Band Councils, including those "chosen according to the
custom of the band, or where there is no council, the chief of the band
chosen according to the custom of the band,"83 authority to enact regulations governing certain matters on the Band's reserve. While these customary Band Councils are not necessarily the same entities that traditionally governed the people under their authority, and while the Minister is
authorized to replace them at any time with an elected council,84 they are
still indigenous entities that were not created entirely by statute.

The Indian Act of Canada lists nearly twenty specific matters on

which the Band Council can adopt by-laws, 5 largely confined to matters

with which "a rural municipality might normally be concerned.

86

ing Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300h-l(e) (1988); the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (the Superfund Act), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1) (amended
1986); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1988) and
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988). See Johnson,
supra note 43, at 704-6.
81. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1377(e) ("The [EPA] is authorized to treat an Indian tribe as a
State" for purposes of several chapters of the Clean Water Act); 30 U.S.C. § 1235(k) (1988)
(holding that tribes are to be treated as states under most provisions of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act).
82. For example, in Rice v. Rehner, the Supreme Court indicated that the "tribes have
long ago been divested of any inherent self-government over liquor regulation." See Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 726 (1983). Yet in United States v. Mazurie, the Court upheld the
Tribe's authority to regulate on-reservation liquor sales by non-Indians because Congress
had expressly delegated that authority to the tribes under 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970). See
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
83. Indian Act c. 1-5, § 2(c) (R.S.C. 1985). The Act also authorizes Band Councils elected
under procedures set forth in the Act. See supra note 46. According to one source, approximately 35% of the Band Councils are selected by customary means; the remaining 65% are
selected under elections authorized by the Act. Johnson, supra note 43, at 709 (citing J.
Woodward, Native Law 164 (1990)).
84. Section 73 of the Indian Act provides that the Governor in Council may declare that
the Band Council "shall be selected by elections to be held in accordance with this Act"
whenever "he deems it advisable for the good government of the band." Indian Act c. 1-5, §
73. See also Macklem, supra note 24, at 1321 n.55 ("The Minister is authorized to replace a
band council selected by custom with an elected council.").
85. Indian Actc. I-5, § 81.
86. Bartlett, supra note 44, at 599. See also, Macklem, supra note 24, at 1321; Johnson,
supra note 43, at 710.
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Moreover, the by-laws must be consistent with the Act and any regulation
made by the Minister.' Thus, the delegation of sovereignty is far from
complete. Still, this portion of the Indian Act can be viewed as a delega-

tion to an already existing customary form of indigenous government of
some authority to set and enforce norms within the community.
The recent Canadian practice of entering into agreements with spe-

cific First Nations can also be characterized as delegation of authority to
existing indigenous governmental structures. The James Bay agreement,
for example, grants rights of self-government that far exceed those contained in the Indian Act to the Cree, Inuit, and Naskapi peoples of north-

ern Quebec in exchange for extinguishment of any aboriginal title
claims. 8 As noted above, such agreements may also result in some kind

of recognition of aboriginal or inherent sovereignty.
2. Delegation of Authority to a State-Created Unit of Government
for Indigenous Peoples
Canada, New Zealand, and Chile, have all delegated some govern-

mental authority to state-created units of indigenous peoples. What distinguishes these grants from those described in section 1, is that the indigenous entity must take the form designated by the government before
it is eligible to exercise the delegated power.8 9
The extent of authority delegated to the entity and the extent to
which the government dictates the exact form the entity must take in order to receive that authority vary from country to country. For example,

New Zealand's 1990 Runanga Iwi Acte9 authorizes iwi, or traditional

units of Maori government,9 to incorporate a runanga, or council, 9' which
87. Indian Actc. 1-5, § 81.
88. Macklem, supra note 24, at 1322.
89. The difference between categories one (already existing unit) and two (state-created
unit) is not as great as at first might appear because U.S. law with respect to Indian tribes
applies only to tribes officially recognized by the United States. More than 200 tribes in the
United States are not currently recognized, including 70 whose relationship with the federal
government was terminated in the 1950s. Getches et al., supra note 53, at 394. Thus, even in
the United States, tribes must meet some criteria before being eligible to receive a delegation
of authority. What distinguishes the U.S. delegation laws from those of other countries (those
in section 2) is that the U.S. tribes do not need to assume a specific form of government
mandated by the United States in order to qualify for federal recognition (and hence delegation of federal authority).
90. Runanga Iwi Act 125, (1990) (N.Z.).
91. Prior to contact with the Europeans, traditional Maori life was generally organized by
three principal social units, the whanau (extended family), the hapu (the sub-tribe), and the
iwi (tribe). See Janet M. Davidson, The Polynesian Foundation, in The Oxford History of
New Zealand 3, 11 (2d ed. 1992).
92. Runanga Iwi Act 125 § 2.
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is then authorized to enter into contracts with the Crown or other agencies
"relating to the provision of services, or the disbursement of funds, to
members of the iwi" 93 and to act as the "authorized voice of the iwi" for
"any enactment that requires consultation with any iwi." 94 By recognizing
the traditional iwi as "an enduring, traditional, and significant form of
social, political and economic organization for Maori," and by electing
not to require any specific form of election or decision-making process
for the runanga, 5 the law comes close to using existing indigenous entities. On the other hand, the powers of the runanga are extremely limited.
They are not given any specific governmental authority. They are to act
as contractors or consultants to government entities.
By contrast, the majority of Band Councils recognized under the Indian Act of Canada must be organized and selected in the manner prescribed by the statute. 96 They are more clearly a state-created unit than are
the runanga iwi. On the other hand, the power they receive from the Indian Act, while still limited,97 extends to a much wider variety of matters
than being a contractor or consultant on individual projects. 98
The 1993 Chilean Indian Law, 99 like the New Zealand Runanga Iwi
Act, allows great flexibility in the structure of the indigenous unit to
which responsibilities are delegated. While the indigenous "Community"
is required to follow a certain procedure in order to be recognized as a
legal entity,"' there is no prescribed form of leadership or governance.
These indigenous Communities are apparently free to organize themselves according to their customs, traditions, and desires. However, the
authority delegated to these Communities is almost as limited as that
given to the Runanga Iwi. Indigenous communities are authorized to receive title to indigenous lands'0 ' - which under the law are exempt from
93. See id. § 27.
94. See id. § 26.
95. The Act provides that the Runanga charter must include "[tihe principles by which
the runanga will be guided in the conduct of its affairs.., the manner in which the runanga
is to be accountable to iwi ... [and] the basis on which members of the runanga are to be
elected or appointed," but it does not provide a prescribed form for any of these matters.
Runanga Iwi Act 125 § 9.
96. See supra notes 46, 84-85.
97. See supra text accompanying note 88.
98. See supra text related to notes 86-87.
99. Ley Indigena, (1993).
100. The Community must be organized at a meeting at which at least one-third of the
eligible members are present. A Notary Public, Civil Register Officer, or Municipal Secretary must be present as well. Minutes of the meeting must be taken, and the incorporation
agreement must be filed with the National Association for Indigenous Development. See Ley
Indigena art. 10.
101. Ley Indigena art. 12.

1998]

THEGRANDEX

RIMEN3

319

taxation102 and subject to a different set of transfer rules than other

lands.1 3 But, the only matter over which they are given any real authority
is the succession of such lands, which under the law is to be determined
in the first instance by ethnic or tribal custom and usage.'t" This allows

the indigenous Community some "law making" ability with respect to
this narrow
issue,105 but no other governing authority is expressly granted
6
to it.1

3. Creation of an Autonomous Subunit of Government in an Area in
Which Indigenous People Constitute a Majority of the Voters
Who Control the Subunit
In the past ten years, two countries - Canada and Nicaragua - have
adopted legislation that authorizes a new form of delegation of sovereignty to indigenous people, the creation of subunits of government in
geographic areas where indigenous people constitute a clear majority.
Unlike the laws discussed in section 1, these laws do not rely on existing
units of indigenous government. They also differ from the laws discussed

in section 2 in that participation in the government is not limited to members of the indigenous community. Moreover, the laws of the two countries themselves vary with respect to important details.

The Nicaraguan law, the Autonomy Statute of the Atlantic Coast

102. See id.

103. With limited exception, the lands may not be conveyed, seized, encumbered or acquired by prescription, except by indigenous Communities, or people of the same ethnic
group or tribe. See id. art. 13.
104. See id. art. 18. The official translation of the law provides that succession "shall be
subject to the usages and customs of each ethnos in respect of estate matters, and alternatively, to the ordinary law." Id.
105. Apparently, the indigenous custom will be enforced only to the extent it is not in
conflict with the ethics, moral sensitivities and public order of Chilean society. See id. art. 7
("The State recognizes the right of indigenes to keep and develop their own cultural expressions, as far as those do not conflict with the ethics, moral conventions, and public order.").
106. In 1989, Australia enacted legislation creating the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Commission. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act, No. 150 (1989)
(Austl.). The Commission is composed of seventeen representatives elected by indigenous
persons from different areas of the country and two members appointed by the Minister. See
id. §§ 27, 101. It acts to aid the govemmefit in formulating and implementing government
programs for the indigenous people of Australia. See id. § 7. While the Australian government has cited the Commission as an example of self-determination, aboriginal organizations
tend to dispute that claim. Garth Nettheim, The Consent of the Native: Mabo and Indigenous
PoliticalRights, 15 Sydney L. Rev. 223, 234 (1993). Because the Commission has no formal
governing power and because it is a pan-indigenous group that does not serve or represent
any particular community or area, it is far from clear that it can really be cited as an example
of delegation of sovereign authority to an indigenous group.
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Regions, 7 was adopted by the Sandinista government in the late 1980s as
a means of settling the uprising of the Miskito Indians. The Miskito resisted, violently at times, Sandinista efforts to consolidate them into the
national economy and culture. 0 8 The law creates two autonomous regions
on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, one of which is dominated by the Miskito Indians.'0 9 The statute implements several provisions of the 1986
Constitution,"0 including provisions recognizing that the "Communities
of the Atlantic Coast have the right to... be granted their own forms of
social organization, and to administer their own local affairs according to
their traditions,"' "obligating the state to "implement a law which establishes autonomous governments in the regions inhabited by the commu' 2
nities of the Atlantic Coast to guarantee the exercise of their rights." 1
The Act creates several levels of government, including a Regional

107. Autonomy Statute for the Regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, Law No. 28,
(Sept. 7 1987), reprinted in Hurst Hannum, Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights
386-395 (1993).
108. As one author explained:
Prior to 1979, most of the indigenous ..
peoples [in the northern part of
Nicaragua's Atlantic coast] had exercised de facto control over the lands
they used for subsistence. After the Sandinista revolution, the government
sought to exert much more direct control over the indigenous coastal populations. This was resisted by the Miskitos, in particular, and various factors
led to open hostilities between many indigenous groups and the Sandinista
government in the early 1980s....
Although the indigenous peoples were themselves divided between those
who supported the contras and those who viewed their struggle as largely
independent of the left-right battle for control of Managua, demands for
autonomy and self-determination were fundamental to both groups.
Hannum, supra note 108, at 381; see also Theodore MacDonald, The Moral Economy of the
Miskito Indians:Local Roots of a GeopoliticalConflict, in Ethnicities and Nations: Processes
of Interethnic Relations in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific 107, 122-144
(1988) (discussing the events leading up to the conflict and its settlement).
109. See Hannum, supranote 108, at 381.
110. The Preamble to the Autonomy Statute cites articles 8, 11, 49, 89, 90, 91, 121, 180
and 181 of the Constitution. Autonomy Statute of the Atlantic Coast Region, art. VIII; Hannum, supranote 108, at 387.
i11. NiCAR. CoNsT. art. 89 (reprintedin Hannum, supra note 108, at 383).
112. Id. The 1986 Constitution also provides that "the state recognizes the communal form
of land ownership of the Communities of the Atlantic Coast," the Communities have the
"right to free expression and preservation of their languages, art and culture," they have "access in their region to education in their native language" and they have "the right to live and
develop under the forms of social organization that correspond to their historic and cultural
traditions," including guarantees of "the benefits of their natural resources, the legitimacy of
their forms of communal property and the free election of their authorities and representatives, and the preservation of their cultures and languages, religion and customs." See Hannum, supra note 108, at 383-85.
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Council and other administrative entities such as municipalities.'

All

Nicaraguan citizens who reside in the region for the requisite time are
eligible to vote for members of the Regional Council." 4 But, because of
vast majority of these new positions
the demographics of the region,' "the
5

[are] filled by Miskito Indians. "

The municipalities in the Region possess authority given to other

municipalities under Nicaraguan law, as well as authority granted them
by the Regional Council." 6 The Regional Council is given authority to

participate in the creation and administration of various economic, cultural, health, and educational programs of the national government and to
impose regional taxes, within limits." 7 However, all resolutions adopted

by the Regional Council must be in harmony with the constitution and
other laws of the country,"' and the Act makes clear that the communities
of the area are an indissoluble part of the unitary and indivisible state of
Nicaragua." 9 Moreover, as of 1992, the North Atlantic Regional Council

had yet to approve any resolutions involving the region. 2° Thus, as one
scholar has noted, these areas may more accurately be called "participatory administrative regions ... rather than truly autonomous

institutions.'' Still, in a country committed to the notion of a unitary
indivisible state, the statute can be viewed as a substantial first step toward granting a measure of sovereignty to indigenous people."
113. See Autonomy Statute art. 15.
114. See id. art. 22. Citizens born

in the region, or whose parents were born there, must
reside in the region for three months before they are eligible to vote. All other citizens must
reside in the region for one year. See id.
115. Lynda Frost, Human Rights Education Programsfor Indigenous Peoples: Teaching
Whose Human Rights?, 7 St. Thom. L. Rev. 699, 716 (1995).
116. See Autonomy Statute art. 17.
117. See id. arts. 8, 23.
118. See id. art. 24.
119. Seeid. art 2.
120. See Frost,supra note 116, at716.
121. Hannum, supra note 108, at 382.
122. In one respect, the Act is not so much a break from the tradition of a unitary Nicaraguan state as a recognition of the de facto autonomy exercised by the Miskito in the area
since the 1600s. "[T]he Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua has been historically separate from the
western portion of the state." Frost, supra note 116, at 714. It is separated from the Pacific
side by "significant geographic barriers and has long been relatively isolated." Hannum,
supranote 108, at 381. "As a result of these conditions, the Atlantic Coast had a large degree
of de facto autonomy for centuries." Frost, supra note 116, at 715. Moreover, the inhabitants
of the region had extensive contact and were heavily influenced by the English during the
first centuries after European contact. MacDonald, supra note 109, at 115-16. Indeed, the
English established formal relations with a Miskito King in 1687 and maintained that relationship until the late 19th century. See Michael D. Olien, The Miskito Kings and the Line of
Succession, 39 1. Anthropological Res. 198, 200 (1983). The provisions of the 1860 Treaty
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The Canadian statute creating the Nunavut 2 3 Territory from the
Northwest Territories, like the Autonomy Statute of Nicaragua, creates a

governmental unit in which a majority of the voters are indigenous people. Like the Autonomy Statute, the Nunavut Act is part of a settlement of
a larger ongoing dispute between indigenous people and the national
government. 2 4 However, the Canadian statute grants the new unit, the

Nunavut Territory, considerable more sovereignty than that given to the
North Atlantic Regional Council in Nicaragua.
The Nunavut Territory will come into existence as a government in

1999, following an implementation plan outlined in the Nunavut Act.'2 5

The Territorial government will take the same form as that currently in
use in the Northwest Territories, with a publicly elected legislature in
control. 26 Although all residents in the Territory are eligible to vote, the

Inuit are likely to control the legislature since they constitute eighty percent of the population in the Territory. 127 Subject to superceding acts of

Parliament, the Nunavut Territorial legislature will have authority to
make laws relating to a variety of subjects, including the administration
of justice, property and civil rights, education, marriage, taxation, and the
of Managua between Britain and Nicaragua provided that the Miskito would be considered
an autonomous political entity within the borders of Nicaragua and that they would "enjoy
the right of governing, according to their own customs... not inconsistent with the sovereign rights of the Republic of Nicaragua ." Id. at 230. The "reincorporation" of the east coast
into Nicaragua in 1894 ended the formal political autonomy of the Miskito, but prior to the
Sandinista revolution in 1979, the Miskitos continued to exercise "de facto control over the
lands they used for subsistence." Id. at 198; Hannum, supra note 108, at 381.
123. In nuktitu, the language of the Inuit indigenous people of the area, Nunavut means
"our land" or "the people's land." See Nigel Bankes, Nunavut, 5 Nalr'l Res. L. Inst. News 2,
16 (1994).
124. Negotiations leading up to the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement lasted sixteen years,
from 1976-1992. See Alexandra Kersey, Comment, The Nunavut Agreement: A Model for
PreservingIndigenous Rights, 11 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 429, 435-41 (1994). An agreement in principle, addressing such issues as "land title, economic development, wildlife
management and conservation, land, resource and environmental management, social and
cultural provisions, and political development," was signed on April 30, 1990. Id. at 439, 440
(quoting Thomas Issac, The Nunavut Agreement-in-Principleand Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 21 Manitoba L. J. 309, 392 (1991)). Pursuant to that agreement in principle,
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Inuit tribal leaders signed the Nunavut Land
Claim Agreement on May 25, 1993. See Kersey, supra, at 429. That agreement in turn required the negotiation of a political accord between the federal government and the Northwest Territories to establish the new territory of Nunavut. See id. at 441. This Accord was
formally signed in 1993. The agreement and the accord received royal assent from Parliament on June 10, 1993. See id; Nunavut Act, 40-41-42 Eliz. II, ch. 28, 29 (1993).
125. See Kersey, supra note 125, at 454-55. See generallyNunavut Act pt. Ill.
126. See Kersey, supra note 125, at 455. See Nunavut Act pt. I.
127. See Kersey, supra note 125, at 455; Bankes, supra note 124, at 18.
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preservation of game.' 28 However, the Chief Executive of the Territory

appointed by, and answerable to, the Governor in
will be a Commissioner
29
Council.
The creation of non-native governmental units in which a majority of
the voters are indigenous people will undoubtedly raise some new and

interesting challenges to those involved in the process, especially those
interested in using the new governmental units to preserve and develop

indigenous cultures and traditions. First, there is some doubt that such
Western-European structures can be used effectively to preserve and de-

velop indigenous cultures, one of the principle purposes of granting selfdetermination to indigenous people. 3 Furthermore, the fact that the in-

digenous majority in the governing subunit is a small minority in .the
larger nation-state which retains direct control over the subunit 3' makes

about the amount of autonomy that will actually be alsome skeptical
32
lowed.
This particular type of delegation may also be of limited utility as a
model for other countries. In both Nicaragua and Canada, it is being im-

plemented in areas historically isolated from the rest of the nation, both
geographically and culturally.13 ' Although there may be other areas in

which similar conditions exist,

34

it may well be that, as one reporter ob-

128. See Nunavut Act pt. I, § 23.
129. See id. pt.I, §§5,6.
130. Some commentators have criticized indigenous peoples' use of "European-westerntype philosophies and structures of authority and decision making," arguing that such use
does violence to traditional indigenous values such as "the reaching of decision by consensus, institutionalized sharing, respect for personal autonomy, and a preference for impersonal
controls and behavior." Menno Boldt & J. Anthony Long, Tribal Traditionsand EuropeanWestern PoliticalIdeologies: The Dilemma of Canada'sNative Indians, in The Quest for
Justice: Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal Rights 333, 334 (1985), quoted in Macklem,
supra note 24, at 1349.
131. The approximately 80,000 Miskitos in Nicaragua represent less than 3% of the more
than 4 million Nicaraguan population. Hannum, supra note 108, at 381; The World Almanac
Book of Facts 804 (1997). The nearly 50,000 Inuit in Canada represent less than .18% of the
more than 29 million Canadians. See The 1997 Canadian Global Almanac 54 (1997).
132. "One commentator has suggested that, 'the fact that Nunavut would be ultimately
subject to federal jurisdiction seriously curtails Aboriginal aspirations for self-government."'
Issac, supra note 125, at 399, quoted in Kersey, supra note 125, at 456.
133. "Due to their location in the climactically and geographically inhospitable North, the
Inuit remained completely isolated from Southern Canada until the late 1890s .... Until the
1920s, the Inuit had little contact with people other than fur traders, missionaries, whalers
and the Royal Northwest Mounted Police .... " Kersey supra note 125, at 432. As a result
the Inuit were not subject to the vast majority of Canadian policies regarding other First
Nations. See id. at 432-34. The Miskito Indians in Nicaragua were similarly isolated from the
rest of the country. See supratext accompanying note 123.
134. For example, the majority of Brazil's indigenous population live in the largely un-
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served with respect to the Nunavut Act, the area is "too big, too remote,
too wildly extraordinary to be imitated.' 35 Still, developments in the
Nunavut Territory and the North Atlantic Autonomous Region will likely
teach us much about the way in which law in the "New World" will de-

velop with respect to rights of indigenous sovereignty.
4.

Delegation of Ability to Determine the Laws and Customs to be
Applied by the National Courts in Actions Involving Indigenous

Persons.
One final form of delegation that can be found in the countries under
review, perhaps the oldest, is delegation of the ability to determine some

of the norms applied by the national courts in actions involving indigenous persons. In 1542, Charles I decreed that "[1]awsuits among the Indians are to be decided... according to their usage and custom."' 3 6 This
"choice of law" provision did not necessarily authorize indigenous people
to enforce their own norms, but it did give them some ability to decide
what norms would be enforced by others.

The 1993 Ley Indigena adopted in Chile contains such a grant of
lawmaking (but not enforcing) authority. Article 54 of that law provides
that at the request of one of the parties to a lawsuit involving members of
the same indigenous ethnos or tribe, the custom enforced among the indigenous tribe shall be the applicable law. "37 This provision gives the in-

digenous people of Chile some control over the conduct of members of
their indigenous groups by extending state enforcement powers to norms
adopted by the group.

A similar, though more limited, grant of law-making authority seems
to have been delegated to the indigenous people of Australia by the Australian High Court's decision in Mabo v. Queensland.3 ' In Mabo, six of
the seven members of the Court agreed that "the common law of this

country recognizes a form of native title which, in the cases where it has
populated and isolated Amazon region. See Marc Pallemaerts, Development, Conservation,
and IndigenousRights in Brazil, 8 Hum. Rights Q. 374 (1986).
135. Welcome Nunavut, Toronto Star, May 30, 1993, at B2, quoted in Kersey, supra note
125, at 465.
136. Cohen, supra note 30, at 52 n.15 (quoting DARCY MCNICKLE, They Came Here First
125-26 (1975)). Similar decrees were issued in 1530, 1542, 1555, 1556 and in the Recopilaci6n de Leyes de Indias of 1680. See James W. Zion & Robert Yazzie, Indigenous Law in
North America in the Wake of Conquest, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 55, 62 (1997).
137. See Ley Indigena art. 54. The use of indigenous customary law authorized by article
54 is clearly subject to the limitation that the custom not be "inconsistent with" the Chilean
Constitution. See id. It may also be subject to the article's seven limitations on the right of
indigenous people to develop their own cultural expressions, as long as they do not conflict
with "ethics, moral conventions, and public order." See CHILE CONST. art. 7.
138. Mabo v. Queensland [1992] 107 A.L.R. I (Austl.).
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not been extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their laws or customs, to their traditional
lands."' 39 While this native title is subject to extinguishment and modification by the Crown, Justice Brennan's leading opinion"4 explained the

following in reference to such action taken by the crown:
[t]he incidents of a particular native title relating to inheritance, the transmission or acquisition of rights and interests on death or marriage, the transfer of
rights and interests in land and the grouping of persons to possess rights and
interests in land are matters to be determined by the laws and customs of the
indigenous inhabitants, provided those laws and customs are not so repugnant
conscience that judicial sanctions under the
to natural justice, equity and good
14
'
new regime must be withheld.

Thus, as one commentator noted, "[t]he High Court's decision in the
Mabo case amounts to an implied legal recognition of Aboriginal customary law."' 42 The aborigines clearly have the authority to determine the
incidents of native title in their communities, and Australian courts are
committed to enforcing those norms, at least against others than the
Crown, "by such legal or equitable remedies as are appropriate to the
particular rights and interests established by the evidence."' 4 3 This is a
limited - but very real - delegation' 44 of law-making authority.' 45
139. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The preamble to the Native Title Act of 1993, recognized
that the High Court had "held that the common law of Australia recognizes a form of native
title that reflects the entitlement of indigenous inhabitants of Australia, in accordance with
their laws and customs, to their traditional lands." Native Title Act, No. 110 (1993) (Austl.)
(preamble at 2130). The Act then made clear that "[s]ubject to this Act, the common law of
Australia in respect of native title has, after 30 June 1993, the force of a law of the Commonwealth." Id. § 12.
140. Justice Brennan authored an opinion with which Chief Justice Mason and Justice
McHugh agreed. See Mabo [1992] 107 A.L.R. at 7. Those three differed from the other three
justices in the majority principally on the issue of whether "extinguishment of native title by
the Crown by inconsistent grant is wrongful and gives rise to a claim for compensatory damages." Id.
141. Id. at44.
142. H.A. Amankwah, Post-Mabo: The Prospectof the Recognition of a Regime of Custonary (Indigenous) Law in Australia, 18 U. Queensland L. J. 15, 32 (1994). See also Di
Otto, A Question of Law or Politics? Indigenous Claims to Sovereignty in Australia, 21
Syracuse J. Int'l L. Com. 65, 71 (1995) ("Aboriginal law and custom is now recognized as a
formal source of law in Australia.").
143. Mabo [1992] 107 A.L.R. at 44 (Brennan, J.).
144. Since the native title is based on aboriginal rights, it might be argued that this lawmaking power is an inherent attribute of aboriginal sovereignty. However, in cases before
and after Mabo, the High Court has consistently rejected the existence of any form of inherent sovereignty.
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Such a delegation of law-making authority is not without its limitations and difficulties. First, there is the question of how a non-indigenous
judge is to know what tribal customs are. The Chilean statute addresses

this by providing that custom can be evidenced by "all means available at
law, and especially by an expert report that shall be made by the Asso'146
ciation [for Indigenous Development] at the request of the Court.
However, there is often considerable disagreement among members of
the same indigenous group as to what tribal custom is,' 47 and the Asso-

ciation on whose expertise the court will often rely in Chile is a government entity headed by persons who are not necessarily indigenous."

Moreover, it may be especially difficult for the civil law trained Chilean
judges, who are accustomed to finding all answers in the applicable code,
to suddenly begin applying oral or newly written standards developed on
a more case-by-case basis by various indigenous groups. The earlier

Spanish experience suggests that the tendency for a judge faced with
these difficulties may be to conclude that the indigenous custom is re-

Mabo is... at odds with the notion that there resides in the Aboriginal people a limited
kind of sovereignty embraced in the notion that they are a 'domestic dependent nation'
entitled to self-government and full rights (save the right of alienation) or that as a free
and independent people they are entitled to any rights and interests other than those created or recognized by the laws of the Commonwealth, the State of New South Wales and
the common law

Walker v. State [1994] 126 A.L.R. 321 (Mason, CJ.) (quoting Isabel Coe on behalf of the
Wiradjuri Tribe v. Commonwealth of Australia and State of New South Wales [1993] 68
A.L.J.R. 110); see also Coe v. Commonwealth [1979] 53 A.L..R. 403 ("The Aboriginal
people. . . have no legislative, executive or judicial organs by which sovereignty might be
exercised. If such organs existed, they would have no powers, except such as the laws of the
Commonwealth, or the state or territory, might confer upon them.").
145. A similar form of indigenous law-making authority has been recognized in some
Canadian case law, although there are cases to the contrary, as well. See John Burrows, With
or Without You: FirstNations Law (in Canada),41 McGill L. J.629, 635-36 (1996). Burrows discusses the challenges Canadian judges face in discovering and interpreting customary law. See id. at 646-64.
146. Ley Indigena art. 54.
147. In 1994, the author worked with one group of indigenous people who were making an
effort to "codify" Mapuche custom for use in judicial proceedings under article 54. Among
other difficulties encountered were the lack of consensus as to what Mapuche custom was (it
seemed to vary from village to village), and the concern that translating the custom from
Mapudugfin (the native language of the Mapuche) into Spanish and from an oral, flexible
form to a written form would change the custom in unacceptable ways.
148. The Association is governed by a National Council composed of seventeen members,
eight of whom must be representatives of the various indigenous groups in Chile. The other
nine are various government officials, who serve at the pleasure of the President. See Ley
Indigena art. 41.
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markably similar to the existing codified law on the subject. 49 Once
again, the results of these "experiments" may be revealing as to the

course the law with respect to indigenous peoples will take in the "New

World." 5 0

C. No FormalNationalAction Recognizing or DelegatingSovereignty

The author was unable to find15 1 any formal national

52

legal docu-

149. "Ultimately, the Spanish were unable to understand traditional Indian law, and used
Spanish law in the Juzagdo General de Indios, despite the royal command to guard and execute the laws of Indians. The Spanish municipal-judicial form was thus imposed on Indian
communities." Zion & Yazzie, supra note 137, at 64.
150. Article 4 of the Mexican Constitution, added in 1992, seems to authorize a similar
form of law-making authority for indigenous peoples.

The Mexican nation has a pluriethnic composition originally based on its indigenous peoples. The law shall protect and promote the development of
their languages, cultures, uses, customs, resources and specific forms of social organization, guaranteeing to their individual members an effective access to the jurisdiction of the State. In agrarian suits and proceeding in
which those members are a party, their legal practicesand customs shall be
taken into account in the terms establishedby the law. (emphasis added).
MEX. CONST. art 4, quoted in Jorge A. Vargas, NAFTA, the Chiapas Rebellion, and the
Emergence of Mexican Ethnic Law, 25 Cal. West'n Int'l L. J. 1, 44 (1994).
It is unclear from the provision itself whether the indigenous custom is to
be applied directly or is only a factor to be taken into account by the judge.
More importantly, the provision does not appear to be self-executing because it requires that the customs be taken into account "in the terms established by the law." At least as of 1995, "the correspondiig federal statute
needed to implement [article 4) at the domestic legal and judicial levels had
not yet been enacted." Vargas, supra, at 63. See also, id. at 66-67 (indicating
that the article was completed in 1995). Thus, while some law-making
authority seems to be contemplated, it may be premature to say that it has
actually been authorized. Accordingly, Mexico is placed in category C.
151. Since the author did not have access to all government documents in Mexico and
Brazil, it is possible that there exists some formal recognition of delegated or inherent
authority on some matters in these countries. However, secondary materials seem to confirm
the results of the author's initial survey of the available information. See, e.g., L. Roberto
Barroso, The Saga of Indigenous People in Brazil: Constitution, Law and Politics, 7 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 645, 667 (1975) (Indigenous people of Brazil "have no political autonomy,
nor are they treated as state members of the Brazilian federation. The Indian leadership has
never claimed.., any sort of... sovereignty.");
Despite the recent change to the Constitution, the indigenous people of
Mexico continue to wait for the enactment of domestic legislation which
will detail their rights, both as individuals and as members of a number of
ethnic minorities, regarding their own territory, language, culture, religion,
justice system, economic base, and form of government.
Vargas, supra note 151, at 44; id. at 50-51 ("indigenous customary law or 'Mexican Ethnic
Law' is not officially recognized").
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ment recognizing or delegating sovereign authority to indigenous people
in Mexico'53 or Brazil. 5 ' This absence of any formal recognition of indigenous sovereignty in the two countries largely results from two vastly

different views about indigenous people reflected in the laws of those
nations. InBrazil, the lack may well be due to the perceived incapacity of

indigenous people to exercise sovereign power. The Brazilian C6digo
Civil reflects the view that indigenous people are relatively incapable of

practicing the acts of civil life and that they are in need of tutorship until
they become completely integrated into Brazilian society. 55 Any act or
152. It appears that state law in the state of Puebla, Mexico, authorizes local government
on some matters in Indian communities. See Maria Teresa Sierra, Indian Rights and Custom-

ary Law in Mexico: A Study of the Nahuas in the Sierra de Puebla,29 L. & Soc. Rev. 227,

235 (1995). A junta auxiliarcomposed of three official elected by the community is responsible for regulating and coordinating community affairs and resolving local disputes and
small offenses. See id. Although the state constitution does not recognize the validity of
customs in judicial procedures, the state apparently allows the junta officials considerable
leeway. See id. at 235-36. More in depth consideration of this form of delegated sovereignty
was not undertaken because it does not represent national policy - the focus of this paper. See
Garth Nettheim, AustralianAborigines and the Law in 2 L. & Anth. 371 (1987) (discussing
state law delegation of authority to aboriginal groups in Australia), reprintedin CLINTON ET
AL., supra note 74, at 1235-36 (describing Queensland system of Aboriginal or Islander
Councils "with a range of local government powers").
153. As previously mentioned, a 1992 amendment to the Mexican constitution seems to
contemplate some delegation of some form of law-making ability (the ability to determine
custom to be considered in agrarian suits in which indigenous peoples are involved), but in
the absence of implementing legislation, the provision has no practical effect.
154. This does not mean that these countries have not developed laws and policies on other
critical issues involving indigenous peoples. Indeed, land issues involving indigenous peoples are one of the most widely discussed legal issues in Brazil. At least four provisions of
the 1988 Constitution of Brazil relate to lands occupied by indigenous peoples. BRAz.
CONST.arts. 20(XI), 49(XVI), 176, 231. Article 231 contains seven sections defining and
protecting the right of indigenous peoples to occupy "Indian lands." Several other provisions
of the Constitution also expressly refer to indigenous people. BRAz. CONST. arts. 22(XIV),
109 (XI), 129(V), 232. Controversy over the government's efforts to demarcate Indian lands
has been extensive over the past few years.
Issues involving indigenous peoples have also dominated political discussions in
Mexico ranging from demands forwarded during the uprising in Chiapas, including indigenous claims to self-determination, to concerns about the impact on indigenous people of
revisions to the ejido land system. See Vargas, supra note 151, at 19, 20-22; see also James J.
Kelly, Jr., Article 27 and Mexican Land Reform. The Legacy of Zapata's Dream, 25 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 541 (1994). The sole focus of this paper, however, is on the various countries' policies with respect to indigenous people's right of sovereignty.
155. See Marc Pallemaerts, Development, Conservation,andIndigenousRights in Brazil, 8
Hum. Rights Q. 374, 378 (1986); Barroso, supra note 152, at 652. Indians are placed into
three categories under the Civil Code: 1) those who are "isolated," who "live in unknown
groups or groups of which there is little and vague data through scattered contacts with ele-
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contract entered into by a "non-integrated" indigenous person without the
approval of the governmental tutor - the Fundacao Nacional do Indio
(FUNAl) - "is held void and of no effect, unless the Indian had the consciousness and knowledge of his attitude and it is not harmful to him in
any way."' 56 This extremely paternalistic view of indigenous peoples,

which is not without its analog in other systems, including the United
States, 157 would naturally be an obstacle to the exercise of self-governing
powers on a larger scale.
In Mexico, the lack of formal recognition of any form of indigenous
sovereignty may well reflect just the opposite view concerning indigenous people. Indigenous people have, from the outset of Mexican inde-

pendence, been considered citizens of the Mexican nation "equal to all
others in the eyes of the law.' 158 Given this deep-seated commitment to
treat all groups the same, it is not surprising that the 1917 Constitution,
the fundamental charter of 20th century Mexico, "did not mention the
words 'Indian' or 'indigenous peoples,' or any similar reference to con-

vey the idea that Mexico is composed of a variety of autochthonous ethnic groups."' 59 Nor is it surprising that this aversion to any racial or ethnic
ments of national society," (2) those who are "in the process of being integrated," who have
established "intermittent or permanent contacts with the civilization," but "keep some of
their native life style" while accepting "progressively, some of the habits and life styles of
the national society," and (3) those who are "integrated," who "are incorporated to the national society, and granted full civil rights, although they may preserve uses, customs, and
traditions of their culture." Estatute Do Indio, C.C. 6.001, Titulo I, art. 4, English translation
reprintedin Barroso, supra note 152, at 652 n. 25.
156. Barroso, supra note 152, at 652-53, (citing Estatute Do Indio, C.C. 6.001, Titulo II,
art. 8). The 1988 Constitution does authorize indigenous peoples to "sue to defend their
rights and interests" on their own, "with the Public Ministry" having a right to intervene "in
all stages of the procedure." BRAz. CONST. art. 232.
157. Under U.S. law, Native Americans holding title to lands allotted to individual Native
Americans during the Allotment Era, are precluded from transferring title or leasing the
property without approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 462 (1988); see generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L. J. 1 (1995) (describing the
history and effect of the Allotment Era).
158.

Guillermo Floris Margandarit, Official Mexican Attitudes Toward the Indians: An

HistoricalEssay, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 964, 964 (1980). This concept was expressed well in the
Plan de Iguala of February 21, 1821, which declared that all Mexican nationals were citizens
without further distinctions. See id. at 976. See also Vargas, supra note 151, at 39 ("As a new
republic, Mexico, inspired by the political and legal system of the United States, and by ideas
of the French encyclopedists, promptly enacted legislation which introduced the unprecedented notion of legal equality to embrace all the new citizens of Mexico, whether they were
criollos, mestizos, Africans, or Indians.").
159. Vargas, supra note 151, at 42. As noted above, article four of the 1917 Constitution
was amended in 1992 to recognize the pluriethnic nature of Mexican society and specific
mention is made of its indigenous culture. See Id. at 44.
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distinction would result in a lack of formal recognition of any sovereignty
for indigenous people.
This lack of formal recognition of any form of indigenous sovereignty in Mexico and Brazil does not mean, however, that indigenous
peoples in these countries have no ability to establish and enforce their
own norms. As several Mexican scholars have noted, "numerous [Mexican] indigenous peoples continue to regulate social relations within their
communities in accordance with traditional rules and norms, which form
a special type of customary law."' 6 Similar observations have been made
with respect to the indigenous people of Australia' 6' and Canada. 6 2 There
is no reason to believe that the same kind of informal sovereignty is not
exercised by the indigenous people of Brazil, especially those who are
largely isolated from the rest of Brazilian society.
Unless the national governments consciously and effectively suppress these informal exercises of indigenous sovereignty, indigenous sovereignty will likely continue to exist, even if not formally recognized.
Thus, even in those countries where no aspect of indigenous sovereignty
has been formally acknowledged, it will likely still exist to some extent.
II.PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This brief overview of the general policies of eight countries with
respect to the amount of sovereignty indigenous groups are allowed to
exercise does not permit final conclusions about the grand "Indian experiments" that have been on-going for the past 500 years. However, a
few tentative observations may be in order.
First, if one were to use the information in this article to rank the
eight countries with respect to the amount of sovereignty allowed to indigenous peoples, the ranking would likely be in the following order,
proceeding from the country where indigenous peoples enjoy the most
160. See id. at 50. See also Salom6n Nahmad, Indigenismo Oficial y Luchas Indigenasen
Mxico in, Derecho Indigena y Derechos Humanos en America Latina 299, 309-12 (1988);
Sierra, supra note 153, passim. The latter two sources contain specific examples of how
customary law has been applied and shaped in different indigenous communities in Mexico.
161. See, e.g., Otto, supra note 143, at 71 ("Despite the lack of Anglo-Australian legal
recognition of Aboriginal and Islander systems of law prior to the Mabo case, many indigenous people have continued to live according to their law."); Barbara Hocking, Aboriginal
Law Does Now Run in Australia, 15 Sydney L. Rev. 187, 196 (1993) ("Despite the findings
of fact made [by some of the Justices in Mabo v. Queensland], there is no doubt that since
time immemorial on the Murray Islands, there has actually been a complex system of land
ownership regulated by orally transmitted knowledge and observed by Murray Islanders.").
162. Burrows, supra note 146, at 636 n.31 ("During the period of Canadian law's disregard
of Aboriginal rights ...First Nations were able to preserve their laws and rights in spite of
the Common law.").
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sovereignty to that where they enjoy the least.
1) United States of America, where Tribes enjoy both inherent and
delegated authority (but where that authority is subject to complete defeasance by Congress and common-law limitations increasingly imposed by
the courts).
2) Canada, where First Nations have delegated authority (including
the Nunavut Territory) and where on-going negotiations and recent constitutional changes have opened the door to a form of inherent sovereignty that may receive constitutional protection.
3) Nicaragua, where the largest group of indigenous people have
delegated authority to operate, within strict limits, local governmental
authority in an area in which they constitute a majority of the population.
4) New Zealand, where a minimum of delegated authority has been
granted to traditional indigenous governments, but where reconsideration
of the Treaty of Waitangi has opened the possibility for even greater
autonomy and perhaps inherent sovereignty.
5) Chile, where there has been a minimum delegation of authority to
state-created indigenous communities, and a grant of law-making, but not
enforcing, authority over cases involving members of the same indigenous group.
6) Australia, where indigenous people are given authority to determine the content of the law with respect to the incidents of native title to
lands, where there is some claim to delegated authority from the national
government, 63 and some actual delegation from state governments.'
7) Mexico, where the constitution has been amended to open the way
for indigenous people to play a role in determining the norms to be applied in some agrarian law suits 65 and where there are some indications
of delegation by state governments." 6
8) Brazil, where indigenous peoples have only informal or de facto
law-making and enforcing authority, not officially recognized by the
government.
If this admittedly subjective ranking is generally accurate, a few
more general observations can be made. First, the existence of treaties
between indigenous people and the government increases the likelihood
that indigenous people will be given greater sovereignty. This largely
unsurprising conclusion," is confirmed by the fact that treaties of some
kind were entered into with indigenous people in three of the four highSee supra text accompanying note 107.
164. See supra text accompanying note 153.
163.

165. See supra text accompanying note 151.
166. See supra text accompanying note 153.
167. As noted above, supra text related to note 30, the mere existence of a treaty relationship implies at least some belief that the indigenous people have some sovereign capacity
because treaty making is generally viewed as a sovereign act.
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est-ranked countries.'6 8 This conclusion may provide added hope to the
Maori in New Zealand and to the Mapuche in Chile, both of whom entered into treaties with the original European invaders.' 69 Moreover, this
observation suggests that those who are in the process of redefining indigenous rights may wish to use the treaty mechanism if the desire is to
increase indigenous sovereignty on a more permanent basis. 7
Second, and again unsurprisingly, there appears to be a relationship
between a stable land base on which indigenous people can reside and the
amount of sovereignty they are allowed to exercise. Just as the feudal
doctrine of dominium came to incorporate both land ownership and governing authority, 7 ' recognition of indigenous sovereignty seems to follow
in the wake of recognition of indigenous land rights. The two highest
ranked countries are ones in which there are formal reservations or reserves on which indigenous peoples can reside. The recent Nunavut Act
in Canada and the Autonomy Statute in Nicaragua were both accompanied by legislative recognition of the land rights of the indigenous people
involved. If there is a relationship between land control and
sovereignty, 7 2 the indigenous peoples of Australia, where native title has
now been recognized for the first time, and Brazil, where indigenous
rights to land are now constitutionalized, may have reason for some longterm optimism with respect to sovereignty. However, those in Mexico,
where the ejidal form of communal property that has provided a land
base for some indigenous groups is becoming more individualized, may
have cause for concern.
Third, although there does not appear to be any direct correlation,'
168. These countries are: United States, Canada, and New Zealand. Moreover, the Miskito
in Nicaragua had entered into formal relations with Great Britain prior to its incorporation
into Nicaragua. See supra note 123.
169. In a rare departure from their normal practice, the Spanish in 1641 entered into a
treaty with the Mapuche at Quillin in which the Spanish recognized the Mapuches as an
independent nation and established the River Bio-Bio as a permanent frontier between the
two peoples. See Eugene H. Korth, Spanish Policy in Colonial Chile 175-77 (1968). Although the Treaty has not been formally recognized by the Chilean government as a basis for
any indigenous rights, the recent resurrection of the once-moribund Treaty of Waitangi demonstrates that Treaty rights can be revived in a meaningful way.
170. This is clearly the mode currently being used by the Canadian government. See supra
text related'to notes 53-54. Some unsuccessful efforts to negotiate treaties have also recently
been made in Australia. See Nettheim, supra note 107, at 236.
171. See generally, Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the MunicipalCorporation,34 Am.
U.L. Rev. 369, 373-76 (1985).
172. The existence of a stable land base may not be absolutely essential to the exercise of
autonomous law-making and enforcing powers, as evidenced by the use of these powers by
the "gypsy" communities of the U.S. See Walter 0. Weyrauch & Maureen A. Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of the Gypsies, 103 Yale L. J. 323 (1993).
173. The policies of Chile (a civil law country) and Australia (a common law country)
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it does appear that indigenous sovereignty tends to be higher in commonlaw countries than in civil-law countries. Whether this reflects more the
differences in early British policy (which favored treaties)' 74 and early
Spanish policy (which did not) or other factors unrelated to the nature of
the legal system is well beyond the scope of this paper. However, it may
well be that the increased flexibility of the case-by-case method of lawmaking that is the hallmark of the common-law system provides more
leeway for the recognition of diverse forms of law-making and enforcement.
Finally, since this article is but a first step in a much larger project of
evaluating the indigenous policies of the various countries of the "New
World," one must ask whether it is worth the effort to go through this
seemingly complex process to determine how one narrow area of the law
has developed? Are there not more important issues to address? After all,
indigenous people make up less that .2% of the population of Brazil,'75
less than 1% of that of the United States,'76 and only a little over 1% in
Canada. 177 Should we spend the enormous amount of time needed to consider the issue thoroughly?
My answer is an unequivocal yes, because much more is at stake
than the future of a small segment of the population - although that by
itself would justify the time and effort involved. At its foundation, the
question is not solely whether our legal systems have developed the right
answers for Indian law. The real question is whether we have developed
legal systems that are capable of governing societies that are increasingly
diverse ethnically, religiously, and economically. Can the legal systems
in the "New World" be shaped to give diverse groups the freedom they
need to satisfy their members' deep-seated desire to determine their own
fundamental values while still maintaining allegiance to the nation itself?
An examination of the development of Indian policy in the "New World"
can provide insights into these critical questions - because in most countries, indigenous people are the most visible and the most diverse of the
appear to be quite similar. In like manner those of Nicaragua and New Zealand seem to be
fairly evenly matched.
174. It seems more than coincidental that development of policy in the highest ranked civil
law country - Nicaragua - was heavily influenced until the late 19th century by the British
influence in the Atlantic Coast area of the country. See supra note 123.
175. According to one estimate, the indigenous people of Brazil constituted only .17% of
the approximately 133 million population of Brazil in 1988. See Maria Teresa Sierra, La
Lucha Por Los Derechos Indigenas en el Brazil Actual 18 (1993).
176. The nearly two million Native Americans represented .8%of the total U.S. population
in the 1990 census. See Getches et. al., supra note 53, at 13.
177. The indigenous population of Canada is, according to one source, 1.5% of the approximately 29 million Canadian population. The World Almanac Book of Facts 1995, 752

(1995).
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normatively divergent groups in society. Moreover, they are often the
least powerful group politically and, therefore, the most dependant on the
protection of the law itself.
Thus, the last 500 years of "Indian experiments" has more to tell us
about the legal systems in which we operate than they do about the nature
of the indigenous people who resided here before those systems arrived.
The oft-repeated words of Felix Cohen apply here perhaps more than in
any other context: "Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts
from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment
of other minorities, reflects the
of Indians, even more than our treatment
178
rise and fall in our democratic faith."'

178. Cohen, supra note 30, at v.

